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Abstract
The work of Easterlin questioned the relationship between economic growth and life
satisfaction. Subsequent research on “Easterlin paradox” provided conflicting evidence,
which suggests that the paradox holds in some conditions but not in others. However, these
conditions were only rarely investigated by the literature, in part because the debate has
been limited by use of country-level aggregated data. Our paper fills this gap by investi-
gating the relationship between economic growth and life satisfaction with individual-level
data. Additionally, we test the hypotheses that economic growth has positive effect on sub-
jective well-being in the presence of high social capital and low income inequality.
We use large comparative data set of World Values Survey and European Values Study.
Multilevel regression allows us to estimate the effect of GDP and economic growth on indi-
vidual subjective well-being, controlling for its individual-level determinants. We also test
if social capital and income inequality moderate this relationship.
Our results show that the Easterlin paradox, stating that economic growth does not
increase people’s well-being, is true only under specific conditions. In particular, in de-
veloped countries, economic growth has a positive effect on life satisfaction if it occurs in
conditions of low growth of income inequality, high levels of social trust, and high growth
of social capital. However, our results also show that economic growth had a predominantly
negative effect on subjective well-being in developing countries.
Our study is the first one to re-examine Easterlin paradox with multilevel model and to
investigate the conditions under which it holds. Our results point out to the importance of
socially sustainable economic growth.
Comments received during the previous presentation
1. it would be interesting to add interaction terms to verify in which conditions does eco-
nomic growth contribute to life satisfaction, and in which it dies not
we investigated interaction terms to account for the levels and changes of income inequality
and social capital
2. we got suggestion to improve the description to make clear the contribution of the paper
we edited the text
3. we got suggestion to clarify the data and method section
we edited the text
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1 Introduction
There seems to be few doubts that the history of human societies is characterized by the quest
for better lives. Generation by generation, people have constantly tried to improve their life
experience. However, discrepancies arise when it comes to establish how to pursue quality
of life and, in particular, what is the role of economic growth. Indeed, the pursue of better
lives has been going hand in hand with material improvements and it is strictly connected
with economic growth. Not by chance people’s quality of life has significantly improved over
the last two centuries, i.e. the same period when modern economic systems were born and
developed. This was also the period when the belief matured that income is a good proxy of
well-being and that economic growth is the way to pursue better lives.
However, the recent development of social sciences, and in particular of economics, ques-
tioned the role of economic growth for well-being. Three main views seem to prevail in this
regard: 1. economic growth does not improve people’s lives; 2. economic growth improves
people’s lives; 3. economic growth matters, but other aspects – such as social capital – matter
more.
According to the first view, initially supported by Richard Easterlin’s evidence of a null
relationship between economic growth and well-being over time (Easterlin, 1974), GDP is not
a reliable measure of people’s well-being and policy-makers should give up the idea of pro-
moting economic growth if they are interested in durable improvements in people’s well-being
(Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009, Easterlin et al., 2010).
The second view, instead, radically rejects the hypothesis that economic growth is not cor-
related to well-being. According to this view, GDP is a good measure of well-being and current
economic policies are the ways to enhance people’s well-being (Deaton, 2008, Inglehart et al.,
2008, Sacks et al., 2010, Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2013).
The third view acknowledges that economic growth is not the only ingredient of well-being
and that also other aspects, such as social capital, freedom and tolerance, matter for well-being
(Bartolini et al., 2013a,b, Bruni and Porta, 2007). According to this view, policies to enhance
people’s well-being should made economic growth compatible with people’s relational needs,
i.e. with those aspects coming from the relationships with others and with the surrounding
environment.
Summarizing, the current academic and political discussion concerns the role of economic
growth for well-being, and whether and in which direction we should change modern eco-
nomic policies. However, large part of the literature supporting these alternative views relies
on country aggregate data to analyze individuals’ characteristics. The fact that one of the main
variables, economic growth, is clearly a country-level factor, pushed researchers towards re-
search designs in which the countries were the units of analysis. As a result, individual-level
variables such as life satisfaction, happiness, membership in groups or associations, or trust
in others were also aggregated at national level and included as country characteristics. How-
ever, this strategy is subject to many shortcomings. For example, since the dependent variable
– subjective well-being – is individual in nature, the inferences based on aggregate data may
conceal the within-country variation, thus creating a risk of ecological fallacy. Such design
does not allow to distinguish between the effects of country- and individual-level factors, for
example income and GDP, or individual membership and membership prevalent in a country.
In such cases, multilevel regression is a better inference method as it allows to properly com-
bine individual and aggregate level variables, maximizing the use of the available information.
However, so far this technique has not been used in the debate about economic growth and
well-being.
Moreover, the analyses using aggregate data rely usually on small sample sizes as the num-
ber of countries available for the analysis – especially countries with sufficiently long time-
series – is limited. In this respect, the techniques currently adopted summarize a large amount
and variability of information in single measures at the cost of losing precision and power. A
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possible way to overcome this shortcoming is to use information on several time points for
each country, rather than characterizing each country with a single value representing the time
trend of the variable of interest (Goldthorpe, 1997). This strategy would increase the number
of observations, the degrees of freedom, and would result in more accurate estimates.
This point is particularly relevant because previous analyses – relying on aggregated, country-
level data – drew their conclusions from simple bivariate correlations, or from regression mod-
els with just one or two predictors. This design is partially imposed by the small size of the
samples (and low number of degrees of freedom) available for these studies. This implies that
current results might be the outcome of some spurious correlations due to the omission of
potential confounding variables.
Finally, part of the literature misses to explicitly distinguish between relationships between
the levels (observed at single point in time) and the relationships between trends (i.e. changes
which occur within countries). Although this distinction is sometimes neglected in interpret-
ing regression results, it is relevant in this particular field of study. The Easterlin paradox, as
well as the broader literature on the topic, is based on the evidence that the cross-sectional
relationships (e.g., between levels of subjective well-being and GDP) differ from the relation-
ships between the changes over time (e.g. between economic growth and changes of subjective
well-being over time). For this reason, explicitly accounting for the difference between levels
and trends of macro factors would allow to refine previous results improving their reliability.
The aim of this study is to contribute to the literature on subjective well-being overcoming
the methodological limitations of previous work to provide evidence in two regards: 1. the role
of economic growth for well-being over time; 2. the conditions under which economic growth
improves people’s well-being.
We adopt a large sample of developed, developing, and transition countries surveyed over a
period of about 30 years, from early 1980s to late 2000s, using World Values Survey and Euro-
pean Values Study data (WVS-EVS), and multilevel regression analysis.This technique allows
to account for the effect of both macro factors and individual-level variables, thus overcoming
the methodological weaknesses of large part of the existing research. Accounting for several
time points for each country allows us to increase the macro-level sample size, as well as to ex-
plicitly distinguish between the levels of the macro factors and their trends. Furthermore, the
literature only rarely examined the conditions under which economic growth exerts a positive
effect on subjective well-being. Previous studies documented that factors such as social capi-
tal or income inequality are important ingredients of people’s well-being. It is plausible that
these factors mediate the role of economic growth for well-being. Our analysis explicitly tests
the hypothesis that economic growth positively affects people’s subjective well-being when it
is accompanied by low income inequality and high social capital.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we summarize the current state of the
literature on the role of economic growth for well-being. Section 3 illustrates the data and the
method adopted in the analysis. We describe our results in section 4, whereas section 5 draws
the conclusion of our work, the policy implications and the lines for future research.
2 The debate on economic growth and well-being
In recent years the public and scientific debate has paid considerable attention to subjective
well-being. The number of scientific articles, conferences and journals dealing with people’s
well-being increased significantly. The media, from magazines to TV shows, have been in-
creasingly ready to report the latest discoveries and to emphasize their implications for peo-
ple’s lives. This debate became so relevant that governments, international institutions and
political organizations started coining this knowledge into policy-oriented guidelines for bet-
ter societies. For example, in 2007 the European Commission and other organizations hosted a
conference titled “Beyond GDP” leading – two years later – to the institution’s commitment to
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improve Europeans’ quality of life (European Commission, 2009). At the same time the French
Economic Commission directed by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (Stiglitz et al., 2009) published a
report recommending the development of indices of well-being to supplement the more com-
monly used income-based measures. In the same vain, in 2011 the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched the “Better Life Initiative” to bring together
internationally comparable measures of well-being and to inform about how well people are
doing in modern societies (OECD, 2011).
The information underlying the whole debate is trivial for it comes from a very simple
question: in the course of surveys, people are asked to evaluate their lives as a whole, i.e.
their subjective well-being. Usually these questions ask directly the respondents to state how
happy or satisfied with their lives they are. For example, subjective well-being, sometimes also
referred to as “happiness” or “life satisfaction”, is usually observed through answers to survey
questions such as: “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” or “All
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” (van Praag
et al., 2003).
These measures proved to be reliable sources of information about individuals’ well-being
and, in the last decades, have been employed in many fields of applied social research, includ-
ing testing the hypothesis that economic growth improves the human lot. The reliability of
these measures has been corroborated by experimental evidence from several disciplines. For
example, subjective well-being correlates with objective measures of well-being such as the
heart rate, blood pressure, frequency of Duchenne smiles and neurological tests of brain activ-
ity (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, van Reekum et al., 2007). Moreover, subjective measures
of well-being are strongly correlated with other proxies of subjective well-being (Schimmack
et al., 2010, Schwarz and Strack, 1999, Wanous and Hudy, 2001) and with the judgements
about the respondent’s happiness provided by friends, relatives or clinical experts (Kahneman
and Krueger, 2006, Layard, 2005, Schneider and Schimmack, 2009).
The reliability and the wide availability of these measures allowed to adopt these tools in
various domains. For example, happiness measures have been adopted in macro as well as
micro-economics (Alesina et al., 2004, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2008), they have been used
for policy evaluations and to study poverty and inequality (Clark et al., 2013, 2012, Diener
et al., 2009). Happiness measures have also been used to analyse the impact of non economic
aspects such as age, gender, marital and employment status on well-being (Powdthavee, 2007,
Stutzer and Frey, 2012) as well as the relationship between the quality of political institutions
and subjective well-being(Frey and Stutzer, 2000).
Probably the reason why the debate on subjective well-being became so prominent is be-
cause happiness measures allow to answer a fundamental question: after years of almost unin-
terrupted economic growth, to what extent have modern societies truly benefited? Paraphras-
ing Easterlin (1974): did economic growth keep its promise of improving the human lot?
The answer to this question is ambiguous: some scholars argue that contemporary societies
should not expect significant improvements for well-being from economic growth (Easterlin,
1974); some others contend this result showing that economic growth and increasing well-
being are associated over time (see e.g. Deaton, 2008, Sacks et al., 2010, Stevenson andWolfers,
2008, Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2013); other scholars point out that the sign of the relationship
between these two dimensions is a matter of the considered countries (developed and develop-
ing countries vs. transition countries) or of the considered time perspective: economic growth
and the trends of well-being are associated in the short run, but this correlation vanishes in
the long run (Becchetti et al., 2011, Clark et al., 2012, Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009, Easterlin
et al., 2010).
Hence, to date, whether economic growth brings about a higher well-being or not is still
a debated issue. However, the literature on quality of life pointed out that beyond economic
growth, other factors matter for well-being and, among these, social capital seems to be a
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particularly relevant one (Bartolini et al., 2013a, Helliwell, 2002, 2008, Uhlaner, 1989).
Consistently with the definitions provided by Putnam (2000) and the OECD (2001), these
studies consider social capital as “networks together with shared norms, values and under-
standings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001, p. 41). Remark-
ably, a number of recent experiments document that social capital is related to subjective well-
being. In particular, it seems that the relational quality of people’s experience, that is to say the
quality of the relationships among people, has a predominant impact on well-being (Becchetti
et al., 2009, Bruni and Stanca, 2008, Helliwell, 2006, Helliwell and Putnam, 2004).
2.1 Role of social capital
What do we know about the relationship between economic growth, social capital and well-
being? A large share of the economic literature agrees on ascribing an important role to social
capital in enhancing economic growth. Recent economic research pointed to social capital as a
catalyst of economic interactions. Many works refer to Arrow’s words describing trust as one
of the elements of every commercial transaction and ascribing some of the backwardness in
the world - at least in part - to the lack of confidence in other people (Arrow, 1972).
Many empirical works found evidence of a positive cross-sectional correlation between
proxies of social capital and economic growth (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004, della Giusta, 2010,
La Porta et al., 1999, Whiteley, 2000, Zak and Knack, 2001). For example, Knack and Keefer
(1997) – one of the most cited works in this field – find that economic performance and so-
cial capital, as proxied by trust and civic cooperation, are strongly and positively associated.
Similarly, Helliwell and Putnam (1995) investigating Italian regions find a positive associa-
tion between levels of “civic community” and GDP growth rates between 1950 and 1990 after
controlling for the initial income level. In a similar vein, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) find
evidence that higher levels of social capital, as proxied by group membership, are correlated
with higher incomes.
There are many reasons to argue that social capital supports economic growth. Social capi-
tal lowers the possibilities for opportunistic behaviors and makes economic transactions safer
and cheaper. This - in turn - makes people free to devote their energies to develop new tech-
niques and investing in productive activities rather than protecting themselves from oppor-
tunistic behaviors. Hence, it is commonly held that more social capital, in the form of more
trust, frees economic resources and enhances business. By the same token, higher social capi-
tal reduces the need for formal institutions to enforce agreements reducing “principal-agent”
problems. Similarly, reliability of public officers is a good condition to attract greater invest-
ments and further economic activity (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Social capital, in the form of
social norms, favors the provision and maintenance of public goods solving collective action
problems thanks to social stigma and ostracism. Finally, social capital can enhance economic
activity also through some indirect channels. For example, “civic norms help voters overcome
the collective action problem in monitoring officials” (Knack and Keefer, 1997, p. 1254).
In summary, there seems to be a general agreement that social capital and economic growth
are correlated. However, some authors argue that economic growth can have detrimental ef-
fects on social capital (see Hirsch (1976), Olson (1982), Polanyi (1968) and more recently Bar-
tolini and Bonatti (2008)).
In his interesting work Roth (2009) claimed that a vibrant society – rich in associational
activity and trust – can efficiently drive collective action against policies for economic growth.
For example, labor market reforms liable to enhance economic activity can be impaired by
an efficient social action resting upon social capital. In a pioneering study on 17 developed
countries, Helliwell (1996) provides evidence of a negative relationship between trust in others
and productivity growth from 1960 to 1992. Moreover, Putnam (2000) provides convincing
evidence that over the last 30 years US – one of the richest countries in the world – experienced
an erosion of social capital while growing more prosperous (Bartolini et al., 2013a, Costa and
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Kahn, 2003, Sarracino, 2012).
Some recent studies also document that: i. social capital is not crystallized and it can vary
over time even in a relatively short term (Sarracino, 2012); ii. economic growth can be the
outcome of social erosion Bartolini and Bonatti (2002, 2008).
Hence, there are reasons to carefully reconsider the relationship between social capital and
economic growth investigating their correlation over time. Using data on social capital from
the first three waves of the World Values Survey, the third European Value Study wave and the
Eurobarometer 25 for 1986, Roth (2009) documents that the changes of trust over time are neg-
atively correlated with economic growth during the ’90s. However, Roth’s work is constrained
by the availability of a relatively short time-series (1980 - 2002) and considers only one proxy of
social capital, namely trust in others. More recently Sarracino (2011) confirms the previously
observed positive correlation between the stock of social capital and GDP across countries, but
he documents a negative and significant relationship between the time-trends of social capital
and economic growth.
2.2 Role of income inequality
Available evidence suggests that, whenever economic growth is accompanied by an increase in
economic inequality, social linkages and feelings of solidarity and cooperation can get weaker
resulting in an erosion of social capital. Vice-versa, when economic growth is not associated
with increasing economic inequality, the effects of economic growth on social capital over time
are non significant. Hence, this evidence points also to the moderating role played by economic
inequality (Frank, 2007). It is also worth noticing that over the last two decades many OECD
countries have been characterized not only by economic growth, disappointing trends of social
capital and of well-being, but also by increasing economic inequality (OECD, 2008). There
are many possible pathways explaining this correlation. The most common one refers to the
decreasing marginal utility of income. According to this interpretation, since richer people
gets relatively less utility from an additional income compared to poorer people, than the
more unequal the distribution of income is, the lower is the average well-being in the society.
Another argument is that income inequality can result in negative social externalities (such as
crime, violence, social cleavages) hindering people’s well-being (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
Another possible explanation refers to risk aversion and the prospects for future mobility: the
more people are concerned about their own situation and prospects, the more they will be
inequality averse to minimize the risk of experiencing a worsening of their status quo. The
impact of inequality on well-being can also be mediated by other-regarding preferences such
as fairness and reciprocity (Fong et al., 2006). According to this view, economic inequality
hinders people’s well-being when it is considered the outcome of an unfair process (Chapple
et al., 2009). It is worth emphasizing that the above mentioned mechanisms are not mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, they can coexist and reinforce each other.
Several papers document that higher income inequality is associated with lower social cap-
ital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2006, Kawachi et al., 1997, Putnam, 2000, Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005), and lower well-being (Clark and D’Ambrosio, 2014, Clark et al., 2008, Graham and
Felton, 2006, Oswald, 1997, Senik, 2009), whereas the relationship with economic growth is
more controversial (see Aghion et al., 1999, for a review). At least three different interpreta-
tions can be identified in the literature: 1. there is a trade-off between distributional equity
and economic growth according to which people can not divide the economic pie more equally
and, at the same time, have more of it; 2. income distribution does not directly affect economic
growth, but eventual redistributive policies can be detrimental to savings and growth; 3. initial
economic inequality can be detrimental to long-run economic growth (Benabou, 1996). Inde-
pendently from the underlying mechanisms, there are many reasons to believe that income
inequality can contribute to shaping the relationship over time between economic growth, so-
cial capital and well-being. In particular, it is plausible to expect that when economic growth
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is associated to income inequality and to declining social capital, the trends of well-being are
disappointing (Josten, 2004). The postulated mechanism for this outcome is that the positive
impact of economic growth on well-being is more than compensated by the erosion of social
capital, by the increase in economic inequality and by the interaction between the latter two
forces. Various cross-national and within country studies explored the relationship between
economic growth, social capital and well-being.
2.3 Cross-national studies
A recent study by Bartolini and Sarracino (2011) explore the relationship among these variables
at aggregated level using WVS-EVS data. The authors compare the trends of social capital – as
proxied by the participation of people in groups and associations – with the trends of subjective
well-being and of GDP per capita considering all the countries with at least 15 years and three
waves of observations, a reasonable long-term.
Results inform that in the long run the trends of group membership is significantly and
positively correlated with subjective well-beingand that this result is robust to a control for the
trends of GDP per capita. This result is consistent with Easterlin’s evidence that in the long
run economic growth is not correlated with the trends of subjective well-beingand it adds that
the trends of group membership are positively correlated with the trends of well-being.
This result is confirmed also after adopting another proxy of social capital: social trust,
available in the European Social Survey (ESS). Also in this case, the coefficients associated with
the trends of social capital, computed over a period of 6 years – a medium rather than a long
period, are strongly and significantly associated with the trends of well-being, whereas GDP
shows a weaker correlation (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2011).
A somewhat consistent result has been provided also by two recent works: focusing on
transition economies, Easterlin (2009) and Bartolini et al. (2012), show that even if economic
growth does matter for people’s well-being, social relationships are confirmed to be important
for subjective well-being.
Summarizing, the evidence from two different data-sets providing internationally compa-
rable information about social capital and well-being trends across countries confirms that
economic growth is only weakly associated with the trend of well-being. The longer the per-
spective, the lower is the role of GDP and the more social capital matters for well-being.
However, this conclusion hinges on cross-country studies – analysis run with aggregated
data on sample of various countries. This casts the doubt that present results are an artifact
due to pulling together countries with different histories, socio-economic backgrounds and
political and cultural systems. For this reason some further studies focused on single countries
analysing the determinants of the trends of well-being on the level of individuals, i.e. within
countries. Also in this case, results show that social capital is an important factor shaping
people’s well-being over time.
2.4 Within country studies
Using data from the US General Social Survey over the last 30 years, Bartolini et al. (2013a)
show that a large portion of the declining American happiness trend is explained by four forces
acting in contrasting directions. The first one is the increase in per capita income, which pos-
itively affects subjective well-being, while the remaining three negatively affect happiness: 1)
social comparisons, which erode approximately 2/3 of the positive impact brought about by
the increase in family income; 2) the decrease in the confidence in institutions, a further com-
ponent of social capitaland 3) the erosion of social capital whose magnitude is comparable to
the one exerted by social comparisons.
The combined effect of these four forces on American subjective well-beingis negative: the
effects of social comparisons, lower confidence in institutions and the erosion of social capitalmore
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than offset the positive impact of increasing income. Simulations reveal that, if social capital-
had stayed constant at its 1975 levels, American subjective well-beingwould have been higher
today.
These relationships have been confirmed more recently also for two other countries: Ger-
many and China. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel and a wider set of variables, Bar-
tolini et al. (2013b) confirm previous results about the US showing that the variation in the
German subjective well-beingbetween 1994 and 2007 is explained by the same forces shap-
ing the American well-being. The only difference, in this case, is that, during the last fifteen
years, German social capitalhas been increasing with an overall positive effect on subjective
well-being. Still, this study suggests that if social capitalhad not increased, the net result for
subjective well-beingwould have been the same as the American one.
More recently Easterlin et al. (2012) and Brockmann et al. (2009) have used various datasets
to explore the relationship among economic growth and well-being also in China, one of the
countries that experienced the most impressive and sustained rate of economic growth over the
last 20 years. It is reasonable to expect that an average yearly economic growth of 9.7% results
in a general improvement of several social, economic and sanitary dimensions of people’s life
and on their well-being more in general. However, also in this case it seems that economic
growth missed to keep its promise of improving the human lot.
Sarracino and Bartolini (2013) has looked into this paradoxical evidence using WVS data
between 1990 and 2007 and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. In line with previous results,
the author finds that the increased importance of social comparisons largely contribute to ex-
plain the disappointing trend of well-being. However, a second force also contributed to shap-
ing the trend of Chinese well-being: the erosion of social capital. Some estimates suggest that
about 18.56% of the well-being loss in China is related to social capital. Hence, the Chinese
economic growth has been going hand in hand with the erosion of social capital, an increase in
social comparisons and decreasing subjective well-being.
Overall, there seems to be convincing evidence that in the long run social capital matters
more for well-being than economic growth. Moreover, the relationship among these three vari-
ables is plausibly moderated by the role of economic inequality. This evidence calls for more
nuanced economic policies to make economic growth compatible with well-being. However,
despite the variety of studies available, present conclusion hinges on fairly simple econometric
techniques, on small sample sizes or on single countries. Our contribution explores the rela-
tionship among economic growth, social capital, economic inequality and well-being trying to
overcome the limitations of previous studies and to provide a sounder framework to define
policies for well-being.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
We use data from the full integrated data set of theWorld Values Survey and the European Val-
ues Study (WVS-EVS), covering the period 1981-2009 (EVS, 2011,WVS, 2009). In the course of
both WVS and EVS research programs, individual country research agencies and institutions
collected data on representative samples of adult populations (aged 18 or older). The question-
naires were uniformly structured and the translation into national languages from the English
questionnaire was closely monitored. The modes of data collection included face-to-face and
phone interviews in case of WVS, face-to-face interviews (either computer assisted (CAPI) or
on pen-and-paper (PAPI)) in case of EVS, and an internet panel (Finland in EVS).
The integrated data set contains information for 102 countries and regions and over 420,000
respondents. However, as the time-trends of macro factors are of particular interest in this
analysis, we include only countries with time series of at least 10 years and 2 waves of obser-
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vation, which considerably limits our sample. Moreover, the analysis for transition countries
is limited to the period after 1995, because of the characteristic, v-shaped economic growth in
countries of this region (or, to be precise, to the economic crisis experienced by these countries
during the early 1990s). With such a specific trajectory, estimating the long term trend of GDP
is problematic, therefore we limit the observation span to the period of relatively monotonic
growth. We also exclude from the analysis Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armenia, and Macedonia,
because the estimated values of trends for these countries are outliers, which suggests prob-
lems with data quality. Overall, this leaves us with 46 countries, including 19 developed, 10
developing, and 17 transition countries. The countries, and the periods for which the relevant
macro factors were observed are presented on Figure 1.
3.2 Variables
Subjective well-being As a proxy of subjective well-being we use an index created from two
variables:
• life satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days? Please use this card to help with your answer” with answers coded on a 10-point scale,
from 1 – dissatisfied to 10 – satisfied, and
• happiness: “Taking all things together, would you say you are (read out and code one answer):
1 Very happy, 2 Rather happy, 3 Not very happy, 4 Not at all happy”.
We construct an index of subjective well being by standardizing and summing both variables
(the scale of happiness variable is reversed for consistency).
GDP The real GDP per capita (retrieved from: Heston et al., 2012) is expressed in interna-
tional dollars of the year 2000 transformed in the logarithm.
Income inequality As a measure of income inequality we use the Gini coefficients from the
Unu Wider Database database (REF).
Social capital We use two measures of social capital: social trust and membership in groups
and associations. Social trust is captured by the answers to the question “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”.
Our individual-level variable is dichotomous and codes as 1 people who declared that people
can be trusted (for a discussion of validity of this question see: Johnson and Mislin, 2012).
Membership at individual level is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for persons
who are members of at least one association or organization. The list of associations includes:
religious organization; education, arts, music or cultural activities; labour unions; political
parties; local political actions; human rights; charitable/humanitarian organization; conserva-
tion, the environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations; youth work; sports or
recreation; women’s group; peace movement; organization concerned with health; consumer
groups; and other.
GDP, income inequality, membership, and social trust are subsequently aggregated to cre-
ate country level and country-wave level variables.
Initial level of country endowments and country-specific trends over time At country level
we measure the macro factors (GDP, Gini coefficient, the percent of respondents with high
social trust, and the percent of respondents belonging to groups or associations) observed in
the initial observation year for particular country. For example, observation for Argentina
started in year 1984, and the values of respective variables for this year are used to capture the
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crisis which resulted in the specific v-shaped trajectory of GDP.
Figure 1: The sample under study: countries included in the analysis (developed countries in the upper panel, transition countries in the middle
panel, and developing countries in the lower panel), and the sample size available for each year.
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cross-country variation of macro-factors. We label the initial values of macro factors as µGDP,
µGini, µTrust and µMembership.
We use the initial values rather than average value over the observation period, because the
average values capture partly the effect of changes that occurred over time. For example, if
economic growth in a country is stronger, also the average value of GDP in this country will be
higher. Thus, using the initial rather than the average value allows us to separate the effects of
the cross-country differences from the effects of changes that took place over time.
At country-wave level we measure the changes of macro-factors (GDP, Gini coefficient, the
percent of respondents with high social trust, and the percent of respondents belonging to
groups or associations) that occurred in given country over time. These changes are captured
as predictions from country-specific regressions of the macro-factors on time. The values of
trends are respectively labeled as ∆s. This procedure is described in Equation 1, where MF
stands for “macro factor”.
MF = αMF + βMFYear + ǫMF (for each country separately)
∆MFjc = αMF +Yearjc · βMF
(1)
The coefficients estimated separately for trends (∆) and for the initial levels (µ) of macro
factors may be interpreted analogously to within-individual and between-individual effects in
regression models for panel data. For example, in a model regressing individual subjective
well-being on macro-predictors, the coefficients estimated for ∆GDP inform what changes of
subjective well-being accompany one unit change of economic growth, whereas the coeffi-
cients for µGDP – what difference of subjective well-being is associated with a 1 unit of GDP
difference between two countries.
3.3 Statistical method
We use multilevel regression which models the individual-level life satisfaction as a function
of both individual and country characteristics. We use multilevel, rather than ordinary OLS
regression, because hierarchical data (such as the multi-country WVS-EVS with individuals
nested within country-waves nested within countries) do not satisfy the basic assumption of
independence of observations. This may lead to biasing downward the standard errors of the
estimates, which in turn can result in wrongly rejecting or supporting theoretically important
conclusions (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992, Luke, 2004). Multilevel models properly account
for the hierarchical structure of the data; they also attribute the variation unexplained by the
model to the specific levels of data.
We estimate a three-level model with individuals i nested within country-waves j, nested
within countries c. The number of waves observed per country varies between 3 and 8 (in case
of Spain). Such a small average cluster size at level 3 is not an obstacle for estimating the effect
at this level, as the total sample size (N > 100) at this level, which is of prime importance, is
sufficient (Snijders, 2005b).
The three-level design allows distinguishing between the country-specific levels of macro
factors (levels of GDP, Gini, social trust, and membership) and the country-wave-specific val-
ues which refer to the changes taking place over time (economic growth, growth of inequality,
trust, and membership). Formally, the model is described by Equations 2-4.
11
SWBijc = α0jc + β1Incomeijc + β2Memebershipijc + β3Trustijc +BKXijc+
+ β4µGDPc + β5∆GDPjc+
+ β6µGinic + β7∆Ginijc + β8∆GDPjcµGinic + β9∆GDP∆Ginijc+
+ β10µSCc + β11∆SCjc + β12∆GDPjcµSCc + β13∆GDP∆SCjc+
+BNwavejc + ǫijc
(2)
α0jc = γ00c + τjc (3)
γ00c = γ000 + νc (4)
In this model, individual subjective well-being (SWB) is regressed on a set of individual,
country-wave, and country level predictors, among them: household income, membership,
and social trust. In Equation 2, coefficient β4 informs about the effect of GDP observed in
given country in the initial observation year, β5 informs about the effect of economic growth.
Coefficients β8, β9, β12, and β13 inform about how the effect of economic growth varies with the
initial level of income inequality (β8), growth of income inequality (β9), initial level of social
capital (i.e. either membership or trust, β12), and growth of social capital (β13). The main
effects of these (potentially) moderating variables are captured by coefficients β6, β7, β10, and
β11. Xijc is a vector of individual level control variables, and BNwavejc is a vector of wave-
dummies.
In the model (see Equations 3 and 4), the only coefficients allowed to vary randomly are
the random intercepts τjc and νc. In other words, the average subjective well-being is allowed
to vary randomly across country-waves and across countries (random intercept model). We
estimate our results with Stata statistical software, with robust standard errors.
Random effect multilevel models (as the one used in this analysis) assume that the random
effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables; if this assumption is not met, the
results are non consistent. Therefore we validate the analysis by estimating models with fixed
intercepts (dummy variables) for countries and country-waves (Snijders, 2005a). Note that this
robustness check is only possible for the variables that vary within countries, because country
dummies absorb the effects of predictors which are constant for countries. Note also that even
with clustered standard errors, OLS models tend to over-reject the null hypothesis (i.e. biasing
the standard errors downwards) compared to multilevel models (Cheah, 2009). ADD THESE
RESULTS
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive results: long-term trends and average levels of macro variables
We start with description of cross-country variation of levels and trends of subjective well-
being, and the levels and trends of macro factors: GDP, income inequality, membership, and
social trust. Figure 2 shows the initial levels of average subjective well-being for particular
countries (i.e. the average observed in the initial year available for given country) and the
estimated yearly trends.
The differences between countries and groups of countries are considerable. Overall, the
developed countries stand out with high initial levels of subjective well-being and they ex-
perience small changes over time. Transition countries stand out with very low initial levels
and positive trends; developing countries stay in between with regard to both initial levels
and trends. The graph also shows that overall subjective well-being was growing more in the
countries where initial levels were lower.
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Figure 2: 10-year trends and initial level of subjective well-being.
Figure 3 shows similar information for GDP, income inequality, aggregated data on mem-
bership and social trust. The pattern of levels and changes of GDP resembles the one observed
for subjective well-being. The growth in developed countries was rather slow, whereas the ini-
tial levels were high. In transition countries the low initial levels were accompanied by fast
growth. The developing countries may be seen as an intermediate case. Again we notice a
correlation of low initial levels and high subsequent growth.
The picture for income inequality is clearly different. The negative correlation between
initial levels and trends is again visible, but the high initial levels characterize the developing
countries. Moreover, the difference between the transition and developed countries is much
less pronounced than in case of GDP or subjective well-being.
For the measures of social capital the correlation between the initial levels and trends is
much weaker than for subjective well-being, GDP, or income inequality. Moreover, each group
of countries stands out with a specific pattern. Developed countries are characterized by mod-
erate initial levels of membership, but high initial levels of social trust. In transition countries
the initial levels or membership were rather high and they declined, whereas the initial levels
of trust were moderate, and they tend to grow. The situation in developing countries is quite
diversified.
Figure 4 shows bivariate correlations between trends of subjective well-being and trends of
GDP, income inequality, and social capital, giving an initial picture of the relationship between
these factors over time. We notice an interesting picture for economic growth: whereas the
changes of GDP seem to promote subjective well-beingin deveoped countries, in developing
countries the growth of GDP erodes subjective well-being, and the relationship in transition
countries is weak but overall negative. Growing income inequality seems to lower subjective
well-beingin developed and developed countries. In contrast to that, in transition countries the
relationship is weakly positive. Growing membership seems a consistent predictor of growing
average subjective well-being. The relationship is positive in all groups of countries. However,
changes of social trust correlate with changes of subjective well-being negatively.
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Figure 3: 10-year trends and average levels of macro factors: GDP (ln, per capita), income
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Figure 4: 10-year trends of subjective well-being vs. trends of macro factors: GDP (ln, per
capita), income inequality (Gini coefficient), membership, and social trust.
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4.2 Multilevel analysis – determinants of life satisfaction
We move to examining the results of multilevel estimation. Table 1 presents the results of
estimations run for each group of countries (developed, developing, and transition countries)
separately; Table 2 shows the results of analysis on the pooled sample, and accounts for in-
teraction effects which allow a different effects of macro factors in each group of countries.
We present both sets of results because each has some advantages. The overall model assumes
equal relationships across groups of countries and the estimation extrapolates the relationships
across groups of countries. At the same time however, this estimation has the advantage of us-
ing a larger sample. The models estimated separately for groups of countries allow different
relationships which are maybe more precise, but the power of estimation suffers because of a
small sample size.
Individual level factors In the tables we present the effects of individual level household
income, membership, and social trust. They all positively correlate with subjective well-being,
although the sizes of the effects differ across models.
GDP The coefficients of µGDP inform how strongly the initial level of GDP predicted the
average subjective well-being. Note that this effect captures exclusively the cross-country vari-
ation and does not account for the effects of GDP changing over time.
Consistently with the literature, in countries with higher GDP subjective well-being is con-
sistently higher than in countries with lower GDP. The sizes of the effects differ between groups
of countries: the results of both Tables 1 and 2 indicate that GDP more strongly correlates with
subjective well-being in transition countries than in developing and developed countries.
Economic growth In contrast to that, and consistently with Easterlin paradox, economic
growth is not a predictor of subjective well-being. Table 2 shows a negative effect, which is
statistically significant in Models 3 and 5 and insignificant in models 1, 2, and 4. Interaction
effects in the analysis for the overall sample suggest a more positive effect in transition coun-
tries (Models 1 and 3 in Table 2), however the separate analysis for transition countries does
not confirm this conclusion (Models 7-9 in Table 1). For developing countries the separate
analysis (Table 1) indicates a statistically significant negative effect in one of the models.
Social capital Subjective well-being is overall higher in countries with higher initial mem-
bership, however this relationship occurs only in the developed countries. In developing and
transition countries this relationship turns insignificant, and the separate analysis shows a
negative correlation in developing countries. Similarly, subjective well-being is higher in high-
trust countries. Again, in transitions countries this relationship does not hold, although the
separate estimations does not confirm that.
Changes of membership are significant in developed countries but only in the separate
analysis (Table 1).
Income inequality We find no main effect of income inequality on subjective well-being.
This relationship is statistically significant only in transition countries, and the direction is
opposite to expected: subjective well-being is higher in countries where the initial level of
income inequality was higher.
Moderating effect of social capital Social capital proved to be significant predictor of the
effect of economic growth on subjective well-being. First, economic growth correlates with
higher subjective well-being in countries where membership was growing. However, this
relationship is observed only in developed, and not in developing or transition countries.
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Table 1: Multilevel regression of subjective well-being on individual and country level predictors. Developed, developing, and transition countries
Developed countries Developing countries Transition countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Individual-level variables:
SWB
trust 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.12
(8.81)∗∗∗ (8.81)∗∗∗ (8.79)∗∗∗ (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (8.66)∗∗∗ (8.66)∗∗∗ (8.67)∗∗∗
membership 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
(7.25)∗∗∗ (7.21)∗∗∗ (7.22)∗∗∗ (3.13)∗∗∗ (3.20)∗∗∗ (3.12)∗∗∗ (5.47)∗∗∗ (5.49)∗∗∗ (5.46)∗∗∗
income (1-10) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
(8.09)∗∗∗ (8.08)∗∗∗ (8.11)∗∗∗ (3.72)∗∗∗ (3.71)∗∗∗ (3.72)∗∗∗ (8.19)∗∗∗ (8.19)∗∗∗ (8.20)∗∗∗
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial levels of macro-factors:
SWB
µ GDP 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.19
(5.52)∗∗∗ (3.50)∗∗∗ (2.83)∗∗∗ (3.78)∗∗∗ (6.41)∗∗∗ (3.62)∗∗∗ (6.29)∗∗∗ (6.36)∗∗∗ (7.63)∗∗∗
µ Gini −0.00 −0.00 0.01
(−0.78) (−0.31) (1.82)+
µMembership 0.25 −0.21 −0.11
(2.33)∗ (−4.52)∗∗∗ (−0.66)
µ Trust 0.37 0.32 −0.95
(1.90)+ (1.31) (−1.47)
Trends of macro-factors:
SWB
Economic growth (∆ GDP) 0.18 0.08 −0.41 −0.37 −0.26 −0.86 0.21 −0.32 −0.25
(0.49) (0.42) (−1.33) (−0.48) (−0.94) (−2.39)∗ (0.37) (−0.87) (−0.47)
∆ Gini 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.48) (0.11) (−0.46)
∆Membership 0.30 −0.33 0.53
(2.25)∗ (−0.92) (1.39)
∆ Trust −0.32 −0.92 −1.15
(−0.93) (−1.21) (−1.30)
Economic growth x Levels and trends of macro-factors:
SWB
∆ GDP x µ Gini −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(−0.65) (0.03) (−0.48)
∆ GDP x ∆ Gini −0.05 −0.00 0.05
1
7
(−2.59)∗∗∗ (−0.12) (2.37)∗
∆ GDP x µMembership −0.28 −0.30 0.49
(−1.06) (−0.56) (1.01)
∆ GDP x ∆Membership 0.99 −0.09 −1.69
(2.10)∗ (−0.27) (−1.46)
∆ GDP x µ Trust 0.74 0.78 1.86
(1.18) (1.52) (1.07)
∆ GDP x ∆ Trust 0.49 7.00 1.04
(0.38) (1.61) (1.55)
AIC 182057 182049 182056 112598 112585 112593 117333 117336 117330
N 94332 94332 94332 47658 47658 47658 54609 54609 54609
Nr Countries 19 19 19 10 10 10 17 17 17
Note: + p < .10, ∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01, t-values in parentheses
Control variables include: gender, age (linear and quadratic component), being married, being unemployed, education (dummies for secondary and tertiary
education), and subjective health.
Source: WVS-EVS data
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Table 2: Multilevel regression of subjective well-being on individual and country level predic-
tors.
All sample
1 2 3 4 5
Individual-level variables:
SWB
trust 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(7.52)∗∗∗ (7.52)∗∗∗ (7.53)∗∗∗ (7.52)∗∗∗ (7.52)∗∗∗
membership 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(8.07)∗∗∗ (8.05)∗∗∗ (8.03)∗∗∗ (8.05)∗∗∗ (8.02)∗∗∗
income (1-10) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(6.96)∗∗∗ (6.97)∗∗∗ (6.97)∗∗∗ (6.97)∗∗∗ (6.97)∗∗∗
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial levels of macro-factors:
SWB
µ GDP 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.13
(5.63)∗∗∗ (4.00)∗∗∗ (2.99)∗∗∗ (4.37)∗∗∗ (3.21)∗∗∗
µ GDP x developing c −0.04 −0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.02
(−0.98) (−0.58) (0.48) (−1.55) (0.36)
µ GDP x trans c 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09
(1.32) (0.57) (1.19) (1.47) (1.74)+
µ Gini −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(−0.46) (−0.30) (−0.04)
µ Gini x developing c 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.38) (1.05) (−0.07)
µ Gini x trans c 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.74)+ (1.63) (0.99)
µMembership 0.27 0.27
(2.84)∗∗∗ (2.73)∗∗∗
µMembership x developing c −0.42 −0.46
(−3.91)∗∗∗ (−3.82)∗∗∗
µMembership x trans c −0.42 −0.30
(−2.01)∗ (−1.53)
µ Trust 0.42 0.35
(2.08)∗ (1.76)+
µ Trust x developing c −0.23 −0.23
(−0.92) (−0.76)
µ Trust x trans c −1.44 −1.36
(−2.01)∗ (−1.57)
Trends of macro-factors:
SWB
Economic growth (∆ GDP) −0.65 −0.35 −0.84 −0.61 −1.22
(−1.20) (−1.38) (−2.39)∗ (−1.08) (−1.73)+
Economic growth (∆ GDP) x developing c 0.24 0.17 0.52 0.10 −0.65
(0.25) (0.37) (1.35) (0.11) (−0.34)
Economic growth (∆ GDP) x trans c 1.50 0.16 0.90 0.94 1.36
(2.38)∗ (0.40) (1.75)+ (1.28) (1.46)
∆ Gini 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.48) (0.68) (0.95)
∆ Gini x developing c −0.00 0.00 −0.02
(−0.20) (0.07) (−1.02)
∆ Gini x trans c −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(−0.84) (−0.72) (−0.71)
∆Membership 0.16 0.20
(0.76) (0.98)
∆Membership x developing c 0.13 0.20
(0.29) (0.38)
∆Membership x trans c 0.23 −0.08
(0.56) (−0.18)
∆ Trust −0.62 −0.54
(−1.62) (−1.40)
∆ Trust x developing c −0.77 −0.43
(−0.68) (−0.34)
∆ Trust x trans c −0.85 −0.60
(−0.89) (−0.62)
Economic growth x Levels and trends of macro-factors:
SWB
∆ GDP x µ Gini 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.75) (0.63) (0.70)
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∆ GDP x µ Gini x developing c −0.00 −0.00 0.02
(−0.07) (−0.12) (0.49)
∆ GDP x µ Gini x trans c −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(−1.38) (−0.95) (−0.79)
∆ GDP x ∆ Gini −0.07 −0.05 −0.06
(−2.94)∗∗∗ (−2.28)∗ (−2.11)∗
∆ GDP x ∆ Gini x developing c 0.07 0.03 0.05
(3.09)∗∗∗ (0.87) (1.90)+
∆ GDP x ∆ Gini x trans c 0.12 0.10 0.11
(3.64)∗∗∗ (2.52)∗ (2.78)∗∗∗
∆ GDP x µMembership −0.11 −0.11
(−0.32) (−0.30)
∆ GDP x µMembership x developing c 0.21 0.39
(0.28) (0.54)
∆ GDP x µMembership x trans c 0.96 0.62
(1.51) (1.11)
∆ GDP x ∆Membership 2.01 1.65
(3.47)∗∗∗ (2.47)∗
∆ GDP x ∆Membership x developing c −2.55 −3.65
(−3.50)∗∗∗ (−2.30)∗
∆ GDP x ∆Membership x trans c −3.20 −1.38
(−2.72)∗∗∗ (−0.89)
∆ GDP x µ Trust 1.20 1.31
(1.82)+ (1.97)∗
∆ GDP x µ Trust x developing c −1.04 0.43
(−1.41) (0.32)
∆ GDP x µ Trust x trans c 0.15 0.14
(0.09) (0.06)
∆ GDP x ∆ Trust 0.57 1.31
(0.41) (1.23)
∆ GDP x ∆ Trust x developing c −1.48 −4.49
(−0.43) (−1.49)
∆ GDP x ∆ Trust x trans c 0.54 −1.65
(0.35) (−1.13)
AIC 417020 417015 417006 417013 417005
N 196599 196599 196599 196599 196599
Nr Countries 46 46 46 46 46
Note: + p < .10, ∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01, t-values in parentheses
Control variables include: gender, age (linear and quadratic component), being married, being unemployed, education
(dummies for secondary and tertiary education), and subjective health.
Source: WVS-EVS data
Second, economic growth correlates with higher subjective well-being in countries where
the initial level of trust was higher. This effect is only visible in the overall analysis, and not in
separate models, which suggests that it is driven by the differences in trust between the three
groups of countries.
Moderating effect of income inequality Finally, we also find the moderating effect of income
inequality on the effect of economic growth on subjective well-being. The effect of economic
growth was more positive in countries which experienced decline (lower growth) of income
inequality. Similarly as in case of moderating effect of membership, we observe the effect only
in developed countries. In developing countries this effect is null.
Similarly as in case of the main effect of income inequality, also the moderating effect is
peculiar in transition countries. Here, economic growth improved subjective well-being more
in countries where inequality was also growing more. Again, this shows an ambiguous role of
income inequality in this group of countries.
5 Conclusions
The availability and reliability of subjective well-being data – i.e. self-reported evaluation
of one’s own life – allowed to study and evaluate to which extent economic growth improves
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people’s quality of life. In recent years, the lively debate that followed the pioneering studies on
the relationship between economic growth and well-being over time Easterlin (1974) reached
a cross-road: which policies are necessary to enhance quality of life?
The answer is at the center of an intense debate where mainly three alternative views are
at stake. Some scholars argue that economic growth does not bring about higher well-being.
Hence, policy-makers who wish to enhance people’s quality of life should abandon GDP as a
measure and as a policy-tool for well-being (Layard, 2005). Some other scholars support the
view that GDP is a reliable measure of how well a society is doing and that its role for the
measurement and the pursuit of people’s well-being should not be downsized (Sacks et al.,
2010). Some other scholars argue that GDPmatters for well-being, but that other dimensions –
such as social capital – matter more. According to the last view, to enhance well-being, policy-
makers should adopt policies to make economic growth compatible with people’s relational
needs (Bartolini et al., 2013a,b).
Summarizing, the fundamental issue to address concerns which strategy should policy-
makers choose and, in particular, which is the role of economic growth for well-being. How-
ever, the literature supporting these alternative views is limited by some shortcomings: i. pre-
vious studies rely on aggregated, national level figures which limit the sample size at the cost
of losing precision and power; ii. in such studies, the proxies of well-being are aggregated at
country level, thus creating a risk of ecological fallacy; iii. previous studies do not account for
country-specific stages of development which might bias the results due to pooling together
different countries; iv. previous analyses adopted simple bivariate correlations, or simple re-
gression models with few predictors thus increasing the risks of drawing conclusions on the
basis of some spurious correlations due to the omission of potential confounding variables; v.
part of the literature misses to distinguish between relationships among levels and relation-
ships among trends of well-being and GDP.
Present work tries to overcome the limitations of previous studies to explore whether eco-
nomic growth brings about well-being and, eventually, which are the conditions that shape
this relationship. In particular, we considered the mediating role of social capital – proxied as
trust in others and membership – and of economic inequality in a multilevel model.
Our figures do not support the hypothesis that economic growth is accompanied by increas-
ing well-being in the long run. On the contrary, in some groups of countries we found evidence
of a negative relationship between the two variables. However, we also found evidence that, at
least in developed countries, social capital and economic inequality have a moderating effect
on the relationship between economic growth and well-being. In particular, our results sug-
gest that economic growth is associated to increasing well-being in developed countries when
it is combined with increasing social participation, higher initial level of trust in others, and
decline or moderate growth of economic inequality. Remarkably, the moderating effect of trust
in others persists in every group of countries. In other words, independently from whether
we consider developed, developing or transition countries, economic growth is accompanied
by increasing well-being in countries with high initial levels of trust in others. Transition
countries are an exception to the general evidence that economic growth and well-being are
associated when economic inequality is declining. In these countries, higher growth of GINI
index are consistent with a positive relationship between economic growth and well-being.
A possible explanation of this effect is in terms of the so-called “tunnel effect”: in countries
where economy is growing, a high degree of economic inequality might result in higher well-
being because people perceive that the conditions of their fellow citizens are increasing and,
therefore, before or later also those who stay behind will receive the expected benefits from
economic growth (Hirschman, 1973).
Other control variables have all the expected signs. In particular, in countries where GDP
is higher, people are happier; within countries richer people tend to be happier than others;
trusting others and membership in associations are both associated to higher levels of well-
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being.
In general, our findings confirm the observation that, in the long run, economic growth is
not associated to an increase in well-being. This result holds in the overall sample of avail-
able countries as well as in each of the three sub-groups: developed, developing and transition
countries. At face value this evidence lends support to the view that modern policies for well-
being should abandon economic growth as their target. However, we also identify a set of
conditions that moderate this relationship making economic growth and well-being compati-
ble.
Hence, a more refined analysis, shows that there are conditions under which economic
growth can be compatible with well-being in the long run. In particular, we provide evidence
that, when economic growth is accompanied by decline of economic inequality and growing
social capital, also people’s well-being increases. This finding brings about two good news: i.
under certain conditions, economic growth is accompanied by well-being in the long run; ii. we
have two hints about which conditions can make economic growth and well-being compatible:
low levels of inequality and growing social capital. Hence, the important message of present
work is that policy-makers wishing to pursue people’s quality of life should adopt policies
that promote economic growth while protecting and promoting social capital, and limiting
economic inequalities.
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